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Prior Restraints on Freedom

of Expression by Defendants
and Defense Attorneys:
Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum
Monroe H. Freedman*
Janet Starwoodt
Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart1 presents the Supreme Court's most
strenuous disapproval of prior restraints on the press to date. Despite its
concern for the first amendment rights of the press, however, the Court
showed no such solicitude for the free speech rights of defendants and their
attorneys. Instead, the two major opinions 2 in Nebraska Press Association
both contain unsupported, conclusory language suggesting that the special protection afforded the press might somehow be inapplicable to
restraints against defendants and defense attorneys. 3 The implication is
that in order to secure their rights to fair trials defendants may have to
sacrifice their first amendment rights in the process.
That conclusion involves the assumption that a defendant's exercise of
free speech is capable of denying the state a fair trial. Even when the
defendant has been the object of pervasive adverse publicity, however, the
Supreme Court has recognized that reversal of a conviction on the ground
that a fair trial has been denied is rarely required. 4 Accordingly, a situation
in which a defendant could generate publicity sufficient to prejudice the
case against the prosecution scarcely can be imagined.
More importantly, fears of defense-generated publicity ignore the
fundamental purpose of many of the important constitutional guarantees:
protecting the individual from the state, not the reverse. The sixth
amendment is concerned explicitly with the fair trial rights of "the
accused," and the fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process are
*A.B. i95i, LL.B. 1954, LL.M. 1956, Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law,
Hofstra University Law School.
tA.B. 1975, Cornell University; J.D. 1978, Hofstra University.
1. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
2. ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the majority was joined by Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, the most extensive of the separate
opinions, was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall.
3. 96 S. Ct. at 280o; id. at 2823 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 2800.
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secured to "any person." Obviously, the Framers of the Constitution were
well aware that it is people who require protection against the potentially
oppressive power of governments and not the other way around.
That truism would not need to be stated but for the fact that judges and
legislators occasionally manage to get it backwards. In Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, for example, Judge Swygert did just that, combining a
good deal of sense with an almost equal amount of nonsense in allowin
restraints on defendants and their counsel in limited circumstances.
Judge Swygert acknowledged that "[t]he Sixth Amendment speaks only of
the right of an accused and the Fifth Amendment only of the right of
persons and not of the Government." 6 By a neat sleight of pen, however,
he equated the sixth amendment more broadly with the "integrity of our
system of justice," 7 and concluded that "public justice is no less important
than an accused's right to a fair trial." 8
Because our society elevates certain aspects of justice to constitutional
status, however, Judge Swygert's conclusion is unquestionably wrong.
Public justice is less important than an accused's right to a fair trial,
precisely because "[t]he Sixth Amendment speaks only of the right of an
accused and the Fifth Amendment only of the right of persons and not of
9
the Government."
Unlike Judge Swygert, the Supreme Court in Nebraska PressAssociation
did not have the benefit of adversarial presentation regarding the first
amendment rights of the accused.'o Unfortunately, the opinions in that
case contain obiter dicta supporting Judge Swygert's conclusion that
5.

522 F.2d 242, 249

6. Id. at

( 7 th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.

3201

(1976).

250.

7. Id. "The [Reardon] Committee's research indicates that, although potentially prejudicial
disclosures by lawyers participating in a criminal case are relatively infrequent, they do occur and
have on many occasions caused considerable difficulty. Moreover, they are particularly likely to
occur in cases that arouse substantial public interest, and in these cases it is not unusual for both
sides to become active in courting public favor through the press." Id. at 25o n.6, citing ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS 'FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL

AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Approved Draft

1968).
8. 522 F.2d at 250. A staff report of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
also confused the Framers' concern over individual rights for a prosecutors' Bill of Rights. The
staff report derived the non sequitur that "especially since the Constitution secures so many rights
for the protection of the defendant," the state has a "right" to a "judicial process untainted by
prejudice against the prosecution." FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL: A STAFF REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 94 th Cong., 2d Sess.

13 (1976). On the contrary, the clear implication of the Constitution is that the accused-not the
government-needs and deserves that special, superior degree of protection against prejudice.
9. 522 F.2d at 250.
io. Erwin Charles Simants, the accused, intervened in this case but did not make this
argument. See Brief for Respondent-Intervenor, Erwin Charles Simants, Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).

February 1977]

RATIO DECIDENDI V. OBITER DICTUM

freedom of speech for the accused may be denied in the name of assuring a
fair trial for the state. That result would be directly contrary to the sound
reasoning of NebraskaPress Association itself in reaching its conclusion that
the press may not be gagged in the interest of a fair trial.
I. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: SOUND HOLDING
BUT INCONSISTENT DICTA

A. The Holding
Within the unequivocal protection of freedom of expression guaranteed
by the first amendment, the Supreme Court has found an even greater or
"special" protection against prior restraints. " Indeed, in New York Times
Co. v. United States 2 "every member of the Court, tacitly or explicitly,
accepted the . . . condemnation of prior restraint as presumptively unconstitutional," 1 3 and in Nebraska Press Association the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that "the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the pre14
sumption against its use continues intact."
However, the Court in Nebraska Press Association divided on the question of just how high those barriers should be. The opinion by ChiefJustice
Burger, with four justices concurring, reiterated "that the guarantees of
freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances ... . 5 Yet Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall were
prepared to hold that prior restraints on freedom of the press to report on
pending litigation are never constitutionally permissible.' 6 In addition,
Justice White expressed "grave doubt" whether such orders would ever be
justifiable, 17 and Justice Stevens indicated that he "may well accept
[Justice Brennan's] ultimate conclusion."'" Apparently at least five members of the Court ultimately may declare that all prior restraints on press
coverage of trials are constitutionally invalid, 9 even though a majority of
the Court did not choose to go that far in Nebraska Press Association.
x I.

9 6 S. Ct. at 2801.
12. 403 U.S. 713 (I97).

13. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 396
(1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoted in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 9 6 S. Ct. 2791, 2802
(0976).
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2808.
15. Id.
x6. Id. at 2809, 2819 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 2808 (White, J., concurring). Despite his doubts about the validity of such
orders, Justice White concurred in the narrower holding because "[t]echnically there is no need to
go farther than the Court does to dispose of this case .... ." Id.
18. Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens preferred not to answer the
broader question without further argument. Id.
19. In addition, Justice Powell wrote a short concurrence "to emphasize the unique burden"
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Certainly some commentators will find that exercise in judicial restraint commendable, 20 despite the fact that the resulting doubt and
confusion may have a chilling effect upon the first amendment and, as
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion indicated, the issues have been
21
thoroughly presented to the Court more than once in the past.
B. The Dicta
Unfortunately, the Court failed to show that same judicial restraint in
its obiter dicta regarding the propriety of prior restraints against freedom
of expression by defendants and their counsel. As explicitly recognized in
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, such issues were not presented to the
Court. 22 Nevertheless, the opinions of both the Chief Justice and Justice
Brennan suggest that, among the less restrictive alternatives available for
dealing with pretrial publicity, courts may choose prior restraints against
defendants and their counsel. 21
Those dicta derive principally from Sheppard v. Maxwell, u4 where the
Supreme Court said:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal
trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of
25
disciplinary measures.

The Sheppard Court also commented that the trial judge "might well have
proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court
official which divulged prejudicial matters .... "26
Significantly, the references in Sheppard v. Maxwell to gagging the
defendant and defense counsel went far beyond the appropriate scope of
that opinion. The issue posed in Sheppard arose out of the "deluge" of
"inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community,"
upon a party who seeks to justify a prior restraint. In doing so, Justice Powell explicated his
standard in such a way as to approach an absolute bar to prior restraints. Id. at 28o8.
20. We are not among the commentators who applaud the majority's restraint. Rather, we
join Justice Brennan in calling for complete prohibition of prior restraints against the press and
urge that the prohibition be extended to protect the first amendment rights of defendants and
their attorneys.
21. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
22. 96 S.Ct. at 2805 n.8.
23. Id. at 28oo; id. at 2823 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring).

24- 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
25. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).

26. Id. at 361.
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thereby depriving the defendant of due process. 27 There was no suggestion
that the defendant, Dr. Sheppard, or his lawyer created publicity that
prejudiced the prosecution. 2 8 The proper scope of the Sheppard decision,
therefore, is expressed in the following holding by the Court:
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
29
accused.

Not only Sheppard but every other Supreme Court decision cited in the
opinions in Nebraska PressAssociation involved publicity, often extremely
severe, that was prejudicial to the accused; 30 yet the Supreme Court upheld
every conviction. 3 1 As the Chief Justice summarized those cases in Nebraska Press Association, they demonstrate that pretrial publicity-"even
pervasive, adverse publicity" against an accused-does not lead inevitably
32
to a denial of due process.
Furthermore, despite some ill-considered dicta 3 3 in cases involving
publicity prejudicial to the accused, the Supreme Court has yet to confront
a case in which pretrial publicity by the defendant has threatened irreparable prejudice to the prosecution's case. That is hardly surprising, of course,
since "the scales of justice in the eyes of the public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against an accused after his indictment. "34 The presumption
of innocence notwithstanding, the impact of an indictment upon the
general public is so great that few defendants will be able to overcome it,
much less turn it to their advantage.
27. Id. at 357, 36328. The Sheppard defense,

however, did attempt to use the news media "to counter adverse
publicity or to create a more favorable climate" for the defendant. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 42-43. Given the posture of the case and the
attitude of the press toward the defendant, such efforts were doomed to failure.
29. 384 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
31. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (extensive pretrial press coverage of the
accused's arrest, alleged crime and prior felony convictions); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541
(1962) (extensive reporting on U.S. Senate investigation and grand jury indictment of the
accused); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1951) (petitioner described as a "werewolf,"
"fiend" and "sex-mad killer" in numerous press reports of his arrest for allegedly molesting and
murdering a 6-year-old girl and of his confession to the crime).
32. 96 S. Ct. at 28oo.

33. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966): "The fact that many of the
prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense, aggravates the
judge's failure to take any action."
34. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7 th Cir. x975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 320X (1976).
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A judicial process untainted by prejudice against the prosecution is
certainly a worthy goal, but that is not the point so far as the Constitution
is concerned. Rather, the point at the constitutional level is simply that no
conflict exists between the defendant's right of free speech and possible
trial prejudice to the government. " The first amendment guarantees the
former; nothing in the Constitution guarantees the latter. If balances are to
be struck, therefore, the language of the first amendment unequivocally
favors individual freedom of expression.
Although that conclusion may appear to be contradicted by some of the
dicta in Nebraska Press Association, the ratio decidendi of the several
opinions in that case clearly and powerfully support it. The Supreme Court
recognized a "special protection" against prior restraints and a "heavy
presumption" against their validity 36 that is not reduced by the temporary
nature of the restraint. 3 7 Prior restraints, whether on "speech [or] publication," are "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights." 38 Further, the Court stressed that "[a] responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration," serving to "[guard] against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial process to extensive public
' 39
scrutiny and criticism. "
35. Moreover, no such conflict exists at the practical level. The fear that defendants will
prejudice the prosecution by exercising freedom of speech is remote, if not fanciful. See note 34
supra and accompanying text.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 28oI-02.

37. The Court also noted the practical problems inherent in framing and enforcing prior
restraints and suggested less restrictive alternatives. "[A] court can anticipate only part of what
will develop that may injure the accused." Id. at 2806. As a result, the order may be underinclusive. Alternatively, an order that sought to cover all possible prejudicial publicity might well
exceed the actual needs of the situation and restrict speech unduly. Instead, the Court suggested
that the impact of prejudicial publicity can be mitigated, and perhaps even eliminated, by a
change of venue, postponement of trial, searching voir dire, careful instructions to the jury, and
sequestration of jurors. Id. at 2805. Some defendants may prefer even to waive their right to a
jury, rather than forego their right to freedom of speech. Most of these devices require defendants
to waive basic constitutional rights in order to assure their right to a fair trial, a problem that
becomes particularly acute when necessitated by prosecutorial misconduct. See note 63 infra and
accompanying text. However, the devices certainly should be made available to defendants as
alternatives to enforced deprivation of free speech. Finally, Justice Brennan noted the prevalence
of plea bargaining, which substantially reduces the likelihood of trial and likewise the necessity to
impanel a jury. Id. at 2822 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan cautioned, however, that
in accepting such pleas, judges "must guard against the danger that pretrial publicity has
effectively coerced the defendant into pleading guilty." Id. at 2822 n.24.
38. Id. at 28o2. "If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it .... .. " Id. at 2803.
39. Id. at 2803, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). Justice Brennan
also expressed concern that "judges and committing magistrates might . . . be determining the
propriety of publishing information that reflects on their competence, integrity or general performance on the bench," thereby exacerbating "the potential for arbitrary and excessive judicial
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In sum, the Court held that prior restraints not only infringe on a basic
constitutional guarantee, but may be destructive of the very purpose they
are intended to serve: the impartial administration of justice. In doing so,
however, the Court focused only on the press as the subject of the restraint;
it should have examined the effects on the defendant as well.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON
THE PARTIES TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Restraints on the Defendant
The foregoing arguments40 against prior restraint of the press militate
at least as forcefully against prior restraints on the freedom of speech of
defendants. But there are additional reasons why the Court should not
approve orders restricting the first amendment rights of defendants and
their attorneys. Both Chief'Justice Burger and Justice Brennan emphasized
the responsibility of the press to safeguard against miscarriages of justice.
That function can be severely impaired, of course, if those who are most
knowledgeable about injustices are silenced at1 the very moment at which
4
they have the greatest incentive to protest.
Indeed, circumstances will virtually never occur in which the right to
freedom ofspeech could be of more importance to an individual than in the
course of criminal proceedings. The prosecutor is privileged to publish to
the world-including the defendant's family, friends, neighbors, and
business associates-what in almost any other context would constitute
libel per se. The indictment may contain detailed charges of the most
heinous conduct, and the delay before ultimate vindication may be many
months, if not years. 42 In the meantime, entirely apart from the proceedings in court, the good name earned during a lifetime can be demolished.
There can be no more pressing occasion, therefore, for immediate, effective, public rebuttal. 43
utilization of any such power" and for "overemployment of the technique." 96 S. Ct. at 2826
(Brennan, J., concurring).
40. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
4 1. One court noted that "it is only when the litigation is pending and current news that
the public's attention can be commanded." Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242,
250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201 (1976).
42. For instance, the publicity surrounding the New York nursing home scandals and the
resulting charges against Dr. Bernard Bergman prompted this remark from the federal judge who
heard the case: "[I]t appears to be undisputed, that the media (and people desiring to be featured
in the media) have vilified him for many kinds of evildoing of which he has in fact been innocent."
United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentencing memorandum).
The comment came 2 years after the attacks in the media began.
43. Cf. Royster, The Free Press and a Fair Trial, 43 N.C.L. REV. 364, 369 (1965):
"I. . . would shudder at the prospect of being charged with some crime, especially one
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Restraints on the Defense Attorney

The defense attorney's freedom of expression regarding pending litigation stems from two sources. The first is the defendant's right to respond
publicly to the prosecutor's charges 4 4 and the attorney's role as the defendant's champion against a "hostile world." 4 ' The second is the attorney's
individual right to freedom of speech.
i. The attorney as representative of the client.
The attorney, as a professional advocate, is likely to be far more
effective than the involved, unsophisticated and inarticulate client in
presenting the latter's point of view. Indeed, clients may do serious
damage to their causes if compelled to deal personally with the press. 4 6 In
reality, moreover, a defendant may not be given the opportunity to deal
with the press. Defendants in highly publicized cases are often held
without bail, 4 7 or bail is set at a sum beyond their reach. In this situation,
the defendant must rely on those "outside," and the logical choice to speak
with the press will be the attorney.
Yet even lawyers fail to perceive the crucial role they play in this regard.
The decision of the District of Columbia Bar to amend its disciplinary rule
relating to trial publicity ironically illustrates the point. As promulgated
by the American Bar Association, that provision restricts attorneygenerated trial publicity in civil cases and administrative proceedings as
well as in criminal cases. In the District of Columbia, however, the rule
was amended to eliminate the trial publicity restrictions but only in civil
cases and in administrative proceedings. 4" The ballot distributed to the
Bar stated the reasons for the amendment:
of moral turpitude, and being condemned to suffer silence until some distant day when even
an acquittal would not be recompense ....
"It may not be so in theory, but in the real world there are policemen out to break all
records in the number of arrests they can make . . . . There are prosecutors with the same
failing. There are officers who in a tense situation yield to the temptation to arrest anyone for
the sake of pacifying a public aroused by a murder or a rape. There have been spite arrests.
There are, indeed, a hundred ways in which justice can be and sometimes is debauched by
those whose job it is to serve it."
44. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v.
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginiaex rel.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 440 (1963).
45. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 145-46 (197 i).

46. As Justice Brennan has observed, "[N]o one has suggested that confessions or statements against interest made by an accused to private individuals. . . would be inadmissible [at
trial]." 96 S. Ct. at 2822 n.25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Many states limit or prohibit bail for capital offenses. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. i5, § 195
(1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-101 (i973).

48. The amendment replaced DR 7-IO7 (G) and (H) with Canon 20 of the old CANONS OF
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No question is raised about the provisions dealing with publicity in criminal
proceedings. However, those dealing with civil and administrative proceedings
obviously need more thought. In their present form they would bar an attorney's
participation in preparing a client's press release responding to an FTC or SEC release
alleging fraud. They would bar a labor union's attorney from participating in a press
conference in which the union denied charges filed with the NLRB. They would
prevent a lawyer from aiding a defendant in a libel action in describing the situation as
he sees it. They would also bar a professional opinion about
pending litigation given
49
expressly for inclusion in a corporation's annual report.

The extraordinary thing about that action by the Bar is its failure to
recognize that the criminal defendant, no less than the defendant in a libel
action, is entitled to a lawyer's assistance in publicly "describing the

situation as he sees it. -,50 Indeed, the administrative proceedings used to
illustrate the reasons for the amendment are those most closely resembling
criminal prosecution: charges filed against a union with the NLRB or
charges of fraud by the FTC or SEC. Despite occasional suggestions that
the first amendment provides broader freedom to public discussion of civil
cases than of criminal cases, 5 1 the Supreme Court has recognized that "the
protection against prior restraint should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings . .,,"52

Some critics suggest that the client should be compelled to forego
professional assistance in communicating with the public because there

may be "a very real conflict of interest between the defendant and his
attorney in criminal cases" 5 3 because "that which enhances the prominence

of the attorney may well result in prejudice to the client." 5 4 Justice
Marshall effectively answered that contention by noting that the adversary

"Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case
justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in court;
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid an exparte statement." ABA CANONS OF PROFESPROFESSIONAL ETHICS:

SIONAL ETHICS No. 20 (1968).

Although that canon condemns trial publicity in general terms, it has been more honored in
the breach than in the observance, in both the Shakespearean and the modern colloquial meanings
of the expression. See W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, Scene iv.
49. The ballot is quoted in M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
259 (975).
50. Id.
5I . See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-59 (7 th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201 (976).
52. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1976).
53. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, § I.I
commentary.

54- Id.
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system presumes "that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the
legal system, as well as to his client" and that no circumstances will
"justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to serve his client
because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted
ethical standards."" 5 For those seriously concerned about this alleged
conflict of interest, surely there are less restrictive ways of dealing with the
problem, including after-the-fact sanctions in the few relevant instances,
rather than broad prior restraints that silence defendants in the face of
public accusations of criminal conduct.
2.

The attorney as individual.

In addition to the attorney's right to freedom of expression as the
client's representative, "[l]awyers also enjoy first-class citizenship ' 5 6 and
are entitled to freedom of expression in their own right. 7 That freedom
traditionally can be restricted only on the basis of some compelling state
interest that takes precedence over it, an interest that will rarely, if ever, be
present.5 8 In addition, for the attorney, just as for the defendant, the need
to be able to speak freely about a specific case may be particularly acute.
The attorney may be especially knowledgeable and concerned about aspects of needed law reform as illustrated by the client's case. 5 9 In addition,
the attorney will be knowledgeable about the specific case at issue and may
feel particularly moved to speak out publicly about the injustices in that
case.6 0 Finally, the attorney may be the subject of well-publicized personal
attacks as a result of representing an unpopular client or cause and therefore
may have an important personal stake in publicly setting the record
61
straight.
55. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring); see cases cited in
note 44 supra.
56. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967). See also id. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring).
57.

Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957).

58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).

59. Moreover, at least insofar as trial publicity is consistent with the client's specific
interests, the attorney has an affirmative professional obligation to urge improvements in the legal
system. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-I (1975).The Code goes so faras to
suggest that the attorney should propose and support law reform "without regard to the general
interests or desires of clients ....
" Id.
6o. See, e.g., Why I Represented Dr. Bernard Bergman, Address by Monroe Freedman
(September I, I976)(on file with StanfordLaw Reiew): "I came to find, as I got further and further
into the case, that Dr. Bergman has been the victim of some of the most irresponsible and
malicious character assassination that I have ever seen." See also note 42 supra.
61. Id. In addition, note the charges against an attorney who sued in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 48 U.S. 323 (974).
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C. Restraints on the Prosecuting Attorney
As an individual, the prosecuting attorney, too, has rights of freedom
62
of speech protected by the first amendment. Moreover, as noted above,
the prosecutor is specially privileged, as a result ofhis or her official status,
to go beyond the bounds that normally restrict other citizens by publishing
charges in an indictment that might otherwise constitute defamation.
Thus, in at least one important respect, the prosecutor's rights of expression are broader than those of the ordinary citizen.
By the same token, however, prosecutors acting in their official governmental capacities 6 3 may be forbidden to publish out-of-court attacks
that might violate a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights to due
process and a fair trial. That is, when the state, through its prosecutor,
undertakes to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, the state in the
person of its prosecutor is limited by the requirements of due process of
law.
Conceivably, the "less restrictive alternative" doctrine might apply to
prosecutors as well as to defendants and their lawyers. However, consideration of the available alternatives suggests that the doctrine is inappropriate, at least when the prejudicial statements are made before the jury is
selected and, therefore, before the jurors can be sequestered. Apart from
sequestration, the most effective alternatives for avoiding the effects of
prejudicial publicity are delaying the trial, changing venue and trying the
case before a judge without a jury. Yet each of those alternatives involves
the forfeiture by the defendant of a right guaranteed by the sixth amendment: the right to a speedy trial, the right to be tried in the state and
district in which the crime was committed and the right to trial by jury. It
is one thing to say that the defendant should be free to exercise his or her
first amendment rights; if that should boomerang and result in so much
prejudicial publicity that the defendant must waive one or more sixth
amendment rights, so be it. 6 4 But a state, through its prosecutors, may
not create prejudicial pretrial publicity that compels the defendant to
62. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
63. Cf. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 79-80.
64. Similarly, the accused might justify a public response by the prosecutor (which otherwise would be improper) by making direct personal attacks upon the prosecutor, such as alleging
that the prosecutor is corrupt or politically motivated in the case. Compare, however, Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 253 ( 7 th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201
(1976): "Admittedly, our formulation may place prosecutors in a difficult position since they may
be criticized for a particular investigation but may not publicly respond. This is a situation that
competing interests necessitate. Ultimately the prosecutor's response will come in the form of an
indictment or information or else the investigation will have ended and his speech will be
unrestricted."
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forfeit other basic rights under the sixth amendment in an effort to avoid
the full impact of the damaging publicity.
III. CONCLUSION

Both the majority opinion and the principal concurring opinion in
Nebraska Press Association marshal a number of compelling reasons for
reaffirming the first amendment's guarantee of freedom ofthe press against
contentions that the sixth amendment right to a fair trial justifies the use of
prior restraints. The Court stressed the role of the press as "the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration," 65 subjecting police, prosecutors and
judges to public scrutiny and criticism. That role might be severely
compromised if judges possessed the means of preventing criticism of their
own performance on the bench. On a more practical level, the Court noted
the possibility of less restrictive alternatives and the difficulty of framing a
prior restraint order properly tailored to the problem at hand.66
Those overwhelming arguments against prior restraints of the press
apply with equal force to prior restraints against defendants and their
attorneys, whose rights of free speech are also explicitly guaranteed by the
first amendment. Moreover, the original justification-the fear of prejudicial publicity-simply does not exist with respect to defendants and their
lawyers. The sixth amendment guarantees a fair trial to the defendant, not
to the state, and the defendant's exercise of first amendment rights poses no
threat to that guarantee. 67 More importantly, the accused has a first
amendment right to reply publicly to the prosecutor's charges, and the
public has a right to hear that reply, because of its ongoing concern for the
integrity of the criminal justice system and the need to hear from those
most directly affected by it.
The irony of Nebraska Press Association is that the opinions recognize so
clearly the infirmities of prior restraints against the press but suggest as a
possible "less restrictive alternative" that trial courts might impose prior
restraints upon defendants and their attorneys. Perhaps because the issue
was not argued or because the problem of prior restraints traditionally has
been framed in terms of the press rather than individuals, the Court
overlooked the ready applicability of its arguments against prior restraints
to situations involving the first amendment rights of defendants. For
whatever reason, the Court appears to have adopted Justice Stewart's
distinction between the first amendment rights of individuals and those of
65.
Maxwell,
66.
67.

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1976), quoting Sheppard v.
384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
See note 37 supra.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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the press, 68 an argument it apparently rejected in Pell v. Procunier.6 9 Yet
the adoption, if such it was, came too easily, in marked contrast to the
careful consideration given the other issues in Nebraska PressAssociation.
Future litigation in this area necessarily will focus upon the conflict
between the Court's ill-considered obiter dicta and the carefully reasoned
ratio decidendi of the two principal opinions in the Nebraska PressAssociation case. Yet the conflict is a superficial one, and the compelling analysis
underlying Nebraska Press Association will require at least the same heavy
presumption against prior restraints on the first amendment rights of
defendants and their attorneys as has been recognized with respect to orders
limiting press reports of pending litigation.
68. Or of the Press, Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), excerpted at 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-35 (1975).
69. 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 ('974).

